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Summary: We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when
the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties.
The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same
quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient types.
The third property is full bunching of types when the available fund is small enough. The fourth
property of the mechanism is that it is a third best one, that is, the output under this regulatory
mechanism is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type.
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1 Introduction
We analyze the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown cost when the regulator has
limited funds. Baron and Myerson [1982] and Laffont and Tirole [1993] developed a procedure
1The authors would like to thank Georg No¨ldeke for encouraging this work. The authors are also thankful
to Debajyoti Chakrabarty, Sougata Poddar and one anonymous referee for helpful comments and important
suggestions. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Graduiertenkolleg (DFG) 629 at the University of Bonn and from the Brussels Capital Region. The authors would
like to thank the seminar participants at the EEA Conference 2003 (Stockholm), at the Indian Statistical Institute
(New Delhi and Kolkata), at the Jadavpur University (Kolkata) and at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences
(Kolkata). The authors are solely responsible for the errors that may remain. An earlier version of this paper
was called “Financing infrastructure under budget constraints”. Since the applicability of the problem developed
in the earlier version is not limited to infrastucture, in this version we have changed the name and content to
incorporate this generality.
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to regulate a monopolist with unknown cost in the absence of any fund constraints. The main
property of the optimal (or second best) mechanism is full separability of types, that is, if the
monopolist is a high (low) cost type then she produces lower (higher) quantity and recieve a lower
(higher) transfer. The cost of separation, induced by the optimal mechanism, is the information
rent enjoyed by the lower cost or more efficient types. The regulator uses its fund to pay this
information rent. However, if there are numerous projects, public funds are usually scarce. It
is reasonable to imagine that the fund provider may be unable to finance the monopolist at the
level prescribed by the optimal mechanism.
When funds are limited, the regulator has two instruments to limit the transfer: (a) bunching
the more efficient types and (b) under-production. The optimal regulatory mechanism, which
we call the constrained optimal mechanism, prescribes that the monopolist supplies a good of
lower quantity (compared to the second best quantity) and that the more efficient types produce
the same quantity. These two distortions reduce the information rent and the quantity produced
by the more efficient types. However, if the fund crisis is “too” strong, the constrained optimal
mechanism prescribes full bunching. We also highlight the difference between the optimal and
the constrained optimal mechanism. Our comparative static result show that a reduction in
available fund reduces the quantities produced by all types and increases the interval in which
there is bunching.
There are several papers dealing with mechanism design problems under asymmetric infor-
mation when there exists budget constraints. Laffont and Robert [1996] describe the optimal
auction when all the bidders have a financial constraint which is common knowledge. Like in
our constrained optimal mechanism, the financial constraint in Laffont and Roberts [1996] re-
duces the bids of all participants (even those with a low valuation for the good). Che and Gale
[2000] extends the result in Laffont and Roberts [1996] by relaxing the assumption that financial
constraints are common knowledge. Monteiro and Page Jr. [1998] describe the optimal selling
mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists in the presence of budget constrained buyers. To
construct the constrained optimal mechanism, we extend the methodology of Thomas [2002].
Thomas [2002] considers the incentive problem of a monopolist who faces financially constrained
buyers. Finally, Gautier [2002] considers the regulator’s mechanism design problem under finan-
cial constraint when there are two types of firm. In Gautier [2002], bunching is an issue only if
the financial constraint is sufficiently strong. We develop and analyze our model in sections 2-4.
All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
2 The model
The utility of the monopolist is Um = t − θq where t is the transfer that she receives from the
regulator and θ is her marginal cost and q is the quantity of the public good she produces.
The utility function of the regulator is Ur = S(q) − t where S(q) is the consumer’s surplus
when a quantity q of public good is supplied and t is the transfer to the monopolist. S(q) is
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assumed to be twice differentiable with S′(q) > 0, S′′(q) < 0 and S′(0) = ∞. The regulator’s
main objective is to select the quantity q to maximize Ur. Since S′(0) =∞, the good is always
produced. If the regulator knows the marginal cost θ of the monopolist, then the optimal
quantity is qf (θ) = S′−1(θ) and the optimal transfer to the monopolist is t(θ) = θqf (θ). The
pair 〈qf (θ), tf (θ)〉 is the first best outcome.2
We assume that the marginal cost of the monopolist is private information. In this context,
we assume that the marginal cost of the monopolist θ belongs to the interval [θ, θ] where 0 <
θ < θ. This interval is assumed to be common knowledge. It is also common knowledge that (i)
the marginal cost has a differentiable density f(θ) and that (ii) f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The
regulator’s objective is to maximize
∫ θ
θ {S(q(θ))− t(θ)} f(θ)dθ subject to incentive compatibility
constraint (or IC) and participation constraint (or PC). A direct mechanism M = 〈q(.), t(.)〉, in
this context, simply specifies a type contingent quantity-transfer pair. Here q : [θ, θ] → R+
and t : [θ, θ] → R+. For simplicity we restrict attention to continuous mechanisms. Let
Um(θ; θ′) = t(θ′)−θq(θ′) be the utility of the monopolist under the mechanismM if her true type
is θ and if she announces θ′ ∈ [θ, θ]. With slight abuse of notation, let us define Um(θ) ≡ Um(θ; θ),
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Incentive compatibility requires that Um(θ) ≥ Um(θ; θ′), for all θ, θ′ ∈ [θ, θ]
and participation constraint states that Um(θ) ≥ 0, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. It is well known in the
literature that the optimal mechanism M satisfies both the incentive compatibility constraint
and the participation constraint if and only if the utility of any type θ ∈ [θ, θ] is given by Um(θ) =∫ θ
θ q(τ)dτ and the optimal type-contingent quantity q(θ) is non-increasing in θ (see Baron and
Myerson [1982]). Before stating our first Proposition, we provide two relevant definitions. For
any θ ∈ [θ, θ], let L(θ) ≡ F (θ)f(θ) be the hazard rate function where F (.) is the distribution function
associated with the density function f(.). For any θ ∈ [θ, θ], let z(θ) ≡ θ + L(θ) be the virtual
type function.
PROPOSITION 2.1 The optimal mechanism is M b = 〈qb(.), tb(.)〉 where
1. qb(θ) = S′−1(z(θ)) and
2. tb(θ) = θqb(θ) +
θ∫
θ
qb(τ)dτ ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]
We omit the proof of Proposition 2.1 since it is quite well known in the literature (see Baron
and Myerson [1982]). It is important to observe that for the benchmark model it is necessary
that qb(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Non-increasingness of quantity is satisfied if and only
if the virtual type z(θ) is non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Given that z(θ) is non-decreasing, we get
qb(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Moreover, since L(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ] and z(θ) > θ, we
get qb(θ) < qf (θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ] and qb(θ) = qf (θ). Thus, for all but the lowest cost firm, we
2In many models of regulation, it is assumed that public subsidies are costly, that is transferring one dollar to
the monopolist costs the authority (1+λ) dollars, where λ represents the shadow cost of public funds (see Laffont
and Tirole [1993]). We assume that this shadow cost of public funds is zero in the relevant range.
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have underproduction under the optimal mechanism compared to the first best outcome. For
our main problem, to be analyzed in the next section, we take the following assumption which
is stronger than non-decreasingness of the virtual type function z(.).
ASSUMPTION 1 For all θ ∈ [θ, θ], θ 6= L(θ) and θ ∈ (θ, θ), θ(1 + L′(θ)) ≥ 2L(θ).
For assumption 1, it is necessary that z(θ) = θ+L(θ) is non-decreasing for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. This
follows from the the second part of assumption 1 since for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], θ > 0 and L(θ) ≥ 0. It
is quite easy to verify that Uniform Distribution satisfy assumption 1. For all density functions
with the property that f ′(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ), assumption 1 is satisfied provided θf(θ) > 1.
Therefore, under certain restrictions, Exponential Distribution, Beta Distributions, Gamma
Distributions, Pareto Distribution and Weibull Distributions satisfy assumption 1. Among the
class of distributions with the property that there exists a non-empty interval (a, b) such that
f ′(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (a, b), Normal Distribution with mean µ = (θ+θ)2 and standard deviation
σ satisfies assumption 1 if and only if 2σ
2θ
(2σ2+θ(µ−θ)) ≥ L(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, µ) and θf(θ) > 1. For
a Logistic Distribution with µ = (θ+θ)2 and standard deviation σ, the sufficient conditions for
assumption 1 are θ ≥
√
3
pi σ and θf(θ) > 1. We obtained the condition for Normal Distribution
by taking doubly-truncated Normal Distribution following Hald’s [1952] convention. The same
double truncation technique was applied to obtain the sufficiency conditions with Logistic Dis-
tribution. For both Normal and Logistic Distributions we assumed symmetry around the mean
µ = θ+θ2 .
3 The constrained optimal mechanism
Complete separation of types is feasible if T¯ ≥ tb(θ) where T¯ is the fund available to the
regulator and tb(θ) is the transfer of the lowest type under the optimal mechanism. This is
because the transfer under the optimal mechanism is strictly decreasing, tb(θ) > tb(θ) for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ]. Therefore, if T¯ ≥ tb(θ) then the optimal mechanism is always feasible. However,
if T¯ < tb(θ), then the regulator’s optimization problem is to select 〈q(θ), t(θ)〉 to maximize∫ θ
θ {S(q(θ))− t(θ)} f(θ)dθ subject to (1) Um(θ) ≥ Um(θ; θ′), ∀θ, θ′ ∈ [θ, θ], (2) Um(θ) ≥ 0,
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] and (3) t(θ) ≤ T¯ ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]. We refer to this problem as [P ∗] and the optimal
solution M∗ = 〈q∗(.), t∗(.)〉 for [P ∗] as the constrained optimal mechanism.
THEOREM 3.1 Under assumption 1, the constrained optimal mechanism M∗ = 〈q∗(.), t∗(.)〉
for the constrained optimization problem [P ∗] specifies the following:










(a) the optimal type contingent quantities are
q∗(θ) =






∀θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]
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where Ψ(θ˜) = F (θ˜)
2
θ˜f(θ˜)−F (θ˜) > 0 = Ψ(θ) ∀ θ˜ ∈ (θ, θ],
(b) the optimal type contingent transfers are
t∗(θ) =





q∗(τ)dτ ∀θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]




2. If T¯ ≤ T, then q∗(θ) = T¯
θ
and t∗(θ) = T¯ ∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ] and the optimal cut-off point is θ˜ = θ.
REMARK 3.1 Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that for any given cut-off point θ˜ ∈
[θ, θ], z(θ)+ Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is non-decreasing in θ for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ]. Monotonicity of z(θ)+ Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is necessary
for the optimal output q∗(θ) to be non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. Moreover, assumption 1 also
guarantees that Ψ(θ) is well defined and non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The second part of
assumption 1, is sufficient for the monotonicity of z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) since it implies and is implied by
non-decreasingness of z(θ) + Ψ(θ)f(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. If the monotonicity of z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is violated
in the non-bunching interval (θ˜, θ], then the analysis can be modified a` la Guesnerie and Laffont
[1984].
From Theorem 3.1 it is obvious that the optimal quantity T¯
θ
for the full bunching case
(that is for T¯ ≤ T) is strictly lower than any q∗(θ) for the partial bunching case (that is for
T¯ > T). Moreover, from Theorem 3.1 it also follows that if the fund limit is not binding, that
is if T¯ ≥ tb(θ), then q∗(θ) = qb(θ) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] since Ψ(θ) = 0. If, instead, T¯ < tb(θ), then
the following two Propositions summarize a comparative study between the constrained optimal
mechanism M∗ and the optimal mechanism M b.
PROPOSITION 3.2 If T¯ < tb(θ), then q∗(θ) < qb(θ) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
PROPOSITION 3.3 Call θˆ = {θ ∈ (θ, θ) | tb(θ) = T¯}. If T¯ < tb(θ) then θˆ ≥ θ˜.
Theorem 3.1 and its two complementary Propositions (3.2 and 3.3) describe the constrained
optimal mechanism and compare it with the optimal mechanism. While full separability of
types is the main property of the optimal mechanism M b, this property does not hold in the
constrained optimal mechanism M∗, at least for the lower cost firms. Hence, with limited fund,
the optimal quantity under the constrained optimal mechanism is strictly lower than that of
the optimal mechanism (see Proposition 3.2). In the constrained optimal mechanism, there is
a conflict between the necessity of separability (the IC constraints) and the fund constraint.
Separability of types implies increasing information rents for the lower cost firms. With limited
funds, it becomes impossible to finance the information rents of the more efficient firms. Hence,
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there is bunching for the lower cost firms. However, the regulator optimally limits the bunching
zone (see Proposition 3.3). For that, the contract offered to the higher cost firms (that is firms
for which the fund limit is non-binding) is distorted compared to the optimal mechanism M b.
Reducing the quantities of the less efficient firms (compared to the optimal mechanism M b),
reduces the information rent, and hence, it is possible to finance separability for a larger fringe
of firms. Without any distortions in quantity, the bunching zone would have been [θ, θˆ], while by
imposing optimal distortions in quantity, the bunching zone is reduced to [θ, θ˜]. This is shown in
Figure 1. The constrained optimal mechanism, described in the Theorem 3.1, takes care of the
trade off between the cost of abandoning separability for the more efficient firms and the cost
of larger distortions to preserve it. However, the cost of keeping separability for high cost firm












Figure 1: The optimal quantities for T¯ = tb(θ) and T¯ ∈ (T, tb(θ)).
REMARK 3.2 In Baron and Myerson [1982], the decision to provide the public good is itself
a regulatory instrument. In their optimal mechanism, the public good is provided whenever
the associated surplus is larger than the cost and this decision does not interfere with the
optimal mechanism. Likewise, if, in our problem, S′(0) is finite, then exclusion of the higher
cost firms from the mechanism is another instrument that can be used to tackle the problem of
limited funds. In our problem, the decision of whether to provide the public good or not can
be incorporated ex-post, together with the cut-off point. Given S′(0) < ∞, let θ∗∗ denote the
highest type for which q∗(θ∗∗) > 0. Then θ∗∗ and θ˜ are determined by the following conditions:
S(q∗(θ∗∗)) = t∗(θ∗∗),
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It is obvious that θ∗∗ is lower than its corresponding value in the optimal mechanismM b. Hence,
the presence of limited funds also reduces the probability F (θ∗∗) that the public good is provided.
Thus, if S′(0) is finite, then it is possible that the provision of public good is delayed due to
fund crisis.
We conclude our analysis on constrained optimal mechanism with a comparative static result.
Consider any two fund limits T¯1 and T¯2 such that T¯1 < T¯2 ≤ tb(θ). With slight abuse of notation,
let q∗i (θ) be the type contingent output and θ˜i be the cut-off point, both associated with the
fund limits T¯i for i = 1, 2.
PROPOSITION 3.4 If T ≤ T¯1 < T¯2 ≤ tb(θ), then Ψ(θ˜1) ≥ Ψ(θ˜2) and θ˜1 > θ˜2 which together
imply q∗1(θ) ≤ q∗2(θ)∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
A reduction in available funds reduces the optimal quantities and the cut-off point (provided
T ≤ T¯1). This comparative static result is intuitive. Due to the scarcity of resources, the
opportunity cost of paying information rents to the more efficient firms increases and hence the
regulator prefers to save on these rents to finance the infrastructure with its available resources.
This result also explains why for a sufficiently small fund T¯ (< T), the constrained optimal
mechanism prescribes full bunching.
3.1 Welfare Implications
The constrained optimal mechanism leads to welfare loss. The welfare is reduced because each
type produces a lower quantity of the public good and hence the consumer surplus is lower.
Moreover, the welfare is also reduced because there is bunching for the more efficient firms. To
satisfy the wealth constraint, the regulator gives up separability for the more efficient firms.
From our comparative static result it is obvious that welfare loss is decreasing in available
resources (T¯ ).
Finally, what happens when the regulator, instead of maximizing only the expected gains
to the consumers, maximizes a weighted sum of the expected gains to the consumers and the
expected utility of the monopolist? To see what happens then, let α ∈ [0, 1] be the welfare
weight attached to the expected utility of the monoplolist. Observe that α = 0 corresponds
to the case we have analyzed so far. If α ∈ (0, 1], the regulators objective is to maximize∫ θ
θ {S(q(θ))− t(θ)} f(θ)dθ + α
∫ θ
θ Um(θ)f(θ)dθ. Here the optimal (or second best) mechanism
specifies qbα(θ) = S
′−1(zα(θ)) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] where zα(θ) = θ+(1−α)L(θ). With limited funds,







where Ψα(θ˜) = Ψ(θ˜)
{





and E(θ | θ ≤ θ˜)
is the conditional expectation of θ given that θ ≤ θ˜. Thus, with welfare weight, the results are
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qualitatively similar to the results obtained so far as long as the distribution function F (.) is
such that q∗α(θ) is non-increasing in θ.
4 Summary
The results and observations of sections 2 and 3 are the following:
1. The constrained optimal mechanism satisfies four properties (a) bunching of the low cost
types (b) separation of the high cost types (c) full bunching if the available fund is small
enough and (d) lower output compared to the optimal mechanism for all types.
2. The constrained optimal mechanism adds distortion in order to optimally reduce the
bunching zone of the low cost (or more efficient) types. This is achieved by reducing
the optimal quantity of the high cost types in comparison to the optimal mechanism.
3. In our problem we have assumed that S′(0) =∞. If instead S′(0) is finite, then exclusion
of the higher cost firms from the mechanism is another instrument that can be used to
tackle the problem of limited funds. In that case we have the possibility that the provision
of public good is delayed due to fund crisis.
4. If the available fund is not “too” small, then a reduction in fund reduces the optimal
quantity for all types and it reduces the cut-off point.
5. The constrained optimal mechanism leads to welfare loss because, relative to the optimal
mechanism, each type produces a lower quantity of the public good that leads to a lower
consumer surplus.
6. If the regulator adds non-zero welfare weight to the monopolist’s utility, then the results
are qualitatively similar to the results obtained in sections 2 and 3 provided the distribution
function is such that the optimal type contingent quantity is non-increasing.
5 Appendix
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1: For a continuous mechanism, IC implies that truth-telling is a






= 0 almost everywhere. This condition
implies that t′(θ) = θq′(θ) almost everywhere. From IC we also know that q(θ) must be non-
increasing in θ and hence t(θ) must be non-increasing in θ.3 For the optimization problem [P ∗],
let θ˜ be the first type for which the fund limit is not binding. Therefore, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜),
3Given that (a) the mechanism is continuous and (b) both q(θ) and t(θ) are non-increasing in θ, we get almost
everywhere differentiability of the mechanism. We are thankful to the referee for pointing this out.
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the fund limit is binding and for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] it is not binding (or free).4 This means that
t′(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜) and t′(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ). From IC and PC we also know
that U ′m(θ) = −q(θ) < 0 almost everywhere and optimality of the mechanism guarantees that
Um(θ) = 0. Finally, non-increasingness of q(θ) implies that q′(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜), q′(θ) ≤ 0
for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ) and since t(.) is not differentiable at θ˜,
q(θ˜−) ≥ q(θ˜+) (5.1)
The regulator’s optimization problem [P ∗] can now be divided into two sub-problems [P ∗1 ]
and [P ∗2 ] for the intervals [θ, θ˜) and [θ˜, θ] respectively.
[P ∗1 ] max
θ˜∫
θ
{S(q1(θ))− Um(θ)− θq1(θ)} f(θ)dθ subject to
1. U ′m(θ) = −q1(θ),
2. T¯ − Um(θ)− θq1(θ) = 0,
3. Um(θ) free, θ˜ and Um(θ˜) given, and
4. q1(θ) ≡ q(θ).
[P ∗2 ] max
θ∫˜
θ
{S(q2(θ))− Um(θ)− θq2(θ)} f(θ)dθ subject to
1. U ′m(θ) = −q2(θ),
2. Um(θ) = 0,
3. θ˜ and Um(θ˜) given, and
4. q2(θ) ≡ q(θ).
[P ∗1 ] and [P ∗2 ] are two optimal control problems. In both these sub-problems q(.) is the
control variable and Um(.) is the state variable. Finally, θ˜ is the optimal cut-off point that links
the two problems.
The Hamiltonian function associated with [P ∗i ] is
Hi(θ) = {S(qi(θ))− Um(θ)− θqi(θ)} f(θ)− λi(θ)qi(θ)
for i = 1, 2. Here λi(θ) is the co-state (or auxiliary) variable associated with the Hamiltonian
Hi(θ) for the type θ. The Lagrangian associated with the sub-problem [P ∗1 ] is L1(θ) = H1(θ) +
µ(θ)[T¯ − Um(θ)− θq1(θ)] where µ(θ) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the type θ.
4Observe that we are assuming that it is possible to find type contingent quantity-transfer pairs which allows for
partial bunching and partial separability. In otherwords, we are trying to find the optimal constrained mechanism
for the case when the available fund T¯ is above some critical level T which allows for partial bunching and partial
separation. The solution to this program will provide the exact amount of this critical level T.
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= {S′(q1(θ))− θ}f(θ)− λ1(θ)− θµ(θ) = 0,
[P ∗1 (2)] λ′1(θ) = − ∂L1(θ)∂Um(θ) = f(θ) + µ(θ),
[P ∗1 (3)] λ1(θ˜) is free,
[P ∗1 (4)] λ1(θ) = 0,
[P ∗1 (5)] µ(θ) ≥ 0 and
[P ∗1 (6)] T¯ − Um(θ)− θq1(θ) = 0.




= {S′(q2(θ))− θ}f(θ)− λ2(θ) = 0,
[P ∗2 (2)] λ′2(θ) = − ∂H2(θ)∂Um(θ) = f(θ),
[P ∗2 (3)] λ2(θ˜) is free and
[P ∗2 (4)] λ2(θ) is free.
From [P ∗1 (2)] we get
λ1(θ) = F (θ) + Ψ(θ) + k1 (5.2)
where Ψ(θ) =
∫ θ
θ µ(τ)dτ and k1 is the constant of integration.
5 Since Ψ(θ) = F (θ) = 0 and since
λ1(θ) = 0 from [P ∗1 (4)], we get k1 = 0. Therefore, from (5.2) we get
λ1(θ) = F (θ) + Ψ(θ) (5.3)
From [P ∗2 (2)] we get
λ2(θ) = F (θ) + k2 (5.4)
where k2 is the constant of integration. Since θ˜ is the optimal cut-off point for the program [P ∗],
we get λ1(θ˜) = λ2(θ˜). Then from conditions (5.3) and (5.4) we get k2 = Ψ(θ˜) and hence
λ2(θ) = F (θ) + Ψ(θ˜) (5.5)
Substituting (5.3) in [P ∗1 (1)] and then simplifying it, using q(θ) = q(θ˜) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), we get
S′(q1(θ˜)) = θ +
F (θ) + Ψ(θ) + θµ(θ)
f(θ)
(5.6)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜).
Similarly, substituting (5.5) in [P ∗2 (1)] and then simplifying it we get for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]
S′(q2(θ)) = θ +
F (θ) + Ψ(θ˜)
f(θ)
(5.7)
5It is important to note that Ψ′(θ) = µ(θ). This fact will be used later to determine the functional form of
Ψ(θ).
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To show that q(.) is continuous at the cut-off point θ˜, we must show that the left hand side of
[P ∗1 (1)] and [P ∗2 (1)] are the same at θ˜, that is {S′(q1(θ˜))− θ˜}f(θ˜)−λ1(θ˜)− θ˜µ(θ˜) = {S′(q2(θ˜))−
θ˜}f(θ˜)− λ2(θ˜). Using λ1(θ˜) = λ2(θ˜) we get
S′(q1(θ˜))− S′(q2(θ˜)) = θ˜µ(θ˜)
f(θ˜)
(5.8)
If µ(θ˜) > 0, then the right hand side of condition (5.8) is positive. This means that S′(q1(θ˜)) >
S′(q2(θ˜)) and hence by strict concavity of S(.) we get q1(θ˜)) < q2(θ˜). This violates condition
(5.1). Therefore, it must be the case that µ(θ˜) = 0 and hence q1(θ˜)) = q2(θ˜).
Therefore, the constrained optimal mechanism M∗ for the partial bunching case satisfies the
following three conditions:
(p1) S′(q∗(θ˜)) = θ + F (θ)+Ψ(θ)+θµ(θ)f(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), µ(θ˜) = 0,
(p2) S′(q∗(θ)) = θ + F (θ)+Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] and
(p3) T¯ = Um(θ˜) + θ˜q∗(θ˜)
Here (p1) follows from condition (5.6), (p2) follows from condition (5.7) and (p3) is obtained
from [P ∗1 (6)] which gives us the optimal cut-off point θ˜.
We now determine Ψ(θ˜). Integrating condition (5.6) after substituting ddθ [θF (θ)] = θf(θ) +
F (θ), ddθ [θΨ(θ)] = θµ(θ) + Ψ(θ) and S
′(q(θ˜)) ≡ c(θ˜) we get
θF (θ) + θΨ(θ) = c(θ˜)F (θ) + k3 (5.9)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜). Here k3 is the constant of integration. Using F (θ) = Ψ(θ) = 0 in condition

















Observe that from the first part of assumption 1 it follows that Ψ(θ˜) is well defined. Moreover,
since Ψ(θ˜) =
∫ θ˜
θ µ(τ)dτ and the Lagrangian multiplier µ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), it is necessary
that Ψ(θ˜) ≥ 0. Observe that Ψ(θ) = 0. Therefore, to show that Ψ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) it is
now more than enough to show that Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). By differentiating Ψ(θ) with
respect to θ ∈ (θ, θ) and then setting it to be non-negative we get θ(1 + L′(θ)) ≥ 2L(θ) for all
θ ∈ (θ, θ) which is the second part of assumption 1. Hence, Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) which





> 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ)
since our assumption that f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] implies that F (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) and
since for Ψ(θ) to be non-negative it is always necessary that θf(θ)−F (θ) > 0. Thus, conditions





> 0 gives us the conditions in Theorem
3.1 when partial bunching is optimal.
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, q∗(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Observe
first that from condition (p1) it follows that q∗(θ) = q∗(θ˜) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜). To show that q∗(θ) is
non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] we have to show that z¯(θ) ≡ z(θ)+ Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ].
Differentiating z¯(θ) with respect to θ ∈ (θ˜, θ) and then setting it to be non-negative we get (c)
f ′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ˜))
f2(θ)
≤ 2. To show that condition (c) is true, it is more than enough to show that
f ′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ))
f2(θ)
≤ 2 since Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) implies that f ′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ˜))
f2(θ)
≤ f ′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ))
f2(θ)
for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ). From the second part of assumption 1 we know that for all θ ∈ (θ, θ),
θ(1 + L′(θ)) ≥ 2L(θ)
or θ
(















































Thus from assumption 1, we get f
′(θ)(F (θ)+Ψ(θ))
f2(θ)
≤ 2 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). Therefore, condition
(c) holds. This proves that z¯(θ) ≡ z(θ) + Ψ(θ˜)f(θ) is non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] and hence
q∗(θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. Observe that θ˜ = θ, corresponds to the transfer T =
θS′−1
(
θ + F (θ)+Ψ(θ)
f(θ)
)
> 0. Therefore, for all T¯ > T the optimal mechanism is a partial bunch-
ing one. Finally, since the Hamiltonian H2 is concave in q(.) and linear in Um(.), the necessary
conditions are also sufficient for [P ∗2 ]. The necessary conditions are also sufficient for [P ∗1 ] since
the Lagrangian L1(θ) is concave in (q, Um) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜) (see Chiang (1992)).
If T¯ ≤ T, then a partial bunching contract is not feasible. Hence, for T¯ ≤ T, the optimal
solution is a full-bunching one implying q∗(θ) = q¯ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Given that the mechanism is
optimal, from IC and PC it follows that Um(θ) =
∫ θ
θ q
∗(τ)dτ and hence we get T¯ −θq¯ = (θ−θ)q¯.
Therefore, T¯ = θq¯. Thus, in the full bunching case θ˜ = θ and q∗(θ) = T¯
θ
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
PROOF OF 3.2: Consider first the partial bunching case, that is consider T < T¯ < tb(θ).





< S′−1(z(θ)). Therefore, q∗(θ) < qb(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. Moreover, for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ˜), q∗(θ) = q∗(θ˜) < qb(θ) since qb(θ) ≥ qb(θ˜) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ˜). For the full bunching case,
that is for T¯ ≤ T < tb(θ), it is obvious that the optimal fixed quantity T¯
θ
is strictly smaller than
any q∗(θ) for the partial bunching case. Hence the result follows.
PROOF OF 3.3: Observe first that by definition θˆqb(θˆ)+
∫ θ
θˆ




Using this observation, we prove the proposition by contradiction. We first assume that θˆ < θ˜.
Then define h(θ) = qb(θ) − q∗(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]. Given Proposition 3.2, h(θ) > 0 for all
12
θ ∈ (θ, θ]. Using the observation we get






qb(τ)dτ = 0 (5.11)
Since by assumption θˆ < θ˜, from the constrained optimal mechanism M∗ we get q∗(θˆ) =
q∗(θ˜). Substituting q∗(θˆ) = q∗(θ˜) in (5.11) we get










qb(τ)dτ ≥ (θ˜ − θˆ)q∗(θ˜), the left hand side of (5.12) is strictly positive. Hence we
have a contradiction.
PROOF OF 3.4: From the constrained optimal mechanism, we know that T¯i = θ˜iq∗i (θ˜i) +∫ θ
θ˜i
q∗i (τ)dτ for i = 1, 2. Given that Ψ′(θ) ≥ 0, we have the following possibilities:
1. θ˜1 > θ˜2 and Ψ(θ˜1) ≥ Ψ(θ˜2) and
2. θ˜1 ≤ θ˜2 and Ψ(θ˜1) ≤ Ψ(θ˜2).










q∗1(τ)dτ < 0 (5.13)




q∗2(τ))dτ ≥ 0 and
∫ θ˜2
θ˜1
q∗1(τ)dτ > 0. Therefore, for condition (5.13) to be true it is neces-
sary that θ˜1q∗1(θ˜1) < θ˜2q∗2(θ˜2). Moreover, for condition (5.13) to hold it is also necessary that
θ˜2q
∗
2(θ˜2) − θ˜1q∗1(θ˜1) >
∫ θ˜2
θ˜1




q∗1(τ)dτ > (θ˜2 − θ˜1)q∗1(θ˜2) since q∗1(θ) > q∗1(θ˜2) for all θ ∈ [θ˜1, θ˜2). Observe






q∗1(τ)dτ . Thus, for this case we get T¯1 > T¯2 which is a contradiction.
Thus, we have proved that only condition (1) is compatible with T¯1 < T¯2. Hence for all
θ ∈ [θ, θ], q∗1(θ) < q∗2(θ).
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